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The Corporate Governance of Profit Shifting 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Tax-motivated profit shifting is an increasingly important element in the agenda of academics and 
policy-makers in the effort to understand tax-planning behavior and to promote tax fairness. In this 
research, we view profit shifting as the outcome of corporate governance characteristics of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), ceteris paribus. Using a sample of 860 parent firms from 24 
countries, 6,698 subsidiaries in 49 countries, we first measure profit shifting from the responses of 
subsidiary profits to parent earnings shocks. We draw on several agency theories of the firm and 
we show that elements of board structure, directors’ experience and networks, and CEO duality 
have an economically important influence on the aggressiveness of profit shifting. Using our 
baseline specification, a one-standard deviation change in these board characteristics implies an 
11.06% total response in our measure of profit shifting.  
 
Keywords: Profit shifting; Corporate governance; Board structure; Directors’ experience; CEO 
duality 
JEL classification: F23, H25, H26; H32, M41 
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1. Introduction 
Profit shifting refers to the tax planning strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to move 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions and increase their after-tax income. Economic globalization 
intensified this practice and triggered increased efforts and policies by local governments and 
international organizations to contain it. Despite these efforts and policies, we know little about 
the intra-firm processes that lead to more aggressive profit shifting. In this study, we aim to 
partially fill this gap by looking into the effects of specific board characteristics on the 
aggressiveness of profit shifting. Guided by agency theory, we show that board structure, and 
directors’ experience and network are key driving factors of profit shifting.  
Profit shifting and corporate governance of MNEs have independently been the focus of 
researchers for more than two decades. We mainly draw our theoretical arguments for a nexus 
between corporate governance and profit shifting from the agency theory of the firm and the 
relevant problems that arise due to intra-firm conflicts of interest. Profit shifting bears both benefits 
and costs to MNEs. The benefits mainly reflect the profits from exploiting taxation differences 
between the parent and subsidiary countries. The costs reflect the administration, opportunity, and 
reputation costs related to the profit-shifting activities. Differences in corporate governance can 
effectively result in differences in the aggressiveness of profit shifting because of potential 
differences in the way management approaches the relative benefits and costs.  
We focus on governance mechanisms that we believe are more closely related to profit-
shifting decisions. First, elements of board structure, such as greater board independence and 
separation of the roles of CEO and board’s chairman (CEO duality) can lead to less profit shifting 
because independent directors, especially those with audit expertise, promote transparent 
accounting practices and improved monitoring, as they care about their own reputation (Li, 
Maydew, Willis and Xu, 2017). In turn, these might lead to less profit shifting (Dyreng, Hoopes 
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and Wilde, 2016). Similarly, MNEs with larger boards can less effectively communicate the 
complex and sometimes controversial profit-shifting procedures, implying less profit shifting for 
these MNEs.  
Second, experienced directors with larger networks can view profit shifting more 
favorably. Expertise reduces profit-shifting uncertainty and the associated costs and thus increases 
the perceived net benefits of the process. Further, larger directors’ networks enhance knowledge 
of internal processes (e.g., knowledge of intra-firm profit-shifting processes) and external practices 
(e.g., country-specific institutional environments) as well as ways to mitigate the costs of profit 
shifting if these arise (e.g., reduction of penalties and reputational costs). Brown (2011) and Brown 
and Drake (2014) demonstrate that board members help to promulgate aggressive tax shelter 
transactions and tax aggressive behavior more broadly through their network ties. 
 We test these hypotheses using data from Orbis and BoardEx. Orbis provides accounting 
data for firms worldwide, as well as detailed information on their ownership structure and links 
between parent companies and subsidiaries. BoardEx collects biographical information on 
executives and board members of public companies. Our sample includes approximately 18,000 
observations from 6,698 subsidiaries and 860 parent firms for the period 2009-2013. This sample 
includes subsidiaries from 49 countries and parent firms from 24 countries.  
 We conduct our empirical analysis in two stages. We first estimate the level of profit 
shifting at the subsidiary-year level, using the differences-in-differences (DID) model of 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013). This model makes the measurement of profit shifting exogenous 
by exploiting earnings shocks to firms that are “comparable” to the parent firm1 and examining 
the propagation of these shocks toward the parent’s subsidiaries. The premise is that an exogenous 
																																								 																				
1 Comparable firms are those in the same industry and country with the parent firm (Bertrand et al., 2002). 
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increase in the profits of the parent implies partial profit shifting to subsidiaries in low-tax 
countries. To improve confidence in the shocks’ exogeneity, we restrict the empirical analysis to 
subsidiaries in different industries (and of course countries) than their parent companies. Then, we 
use the partial fitted values from the DID model as our estimates of what we refer to as “profit-
shifting response” to the exogenous shocks. These responses are our firm-year measure for 
aggressiveness of profit-shifting behavior of parent firms. 
 In the second stage, we examine the effect of the parents’ corporate governance 
characteristics, mainly boards’ structure, directors’ experience, and CEO’s presence in the board, 
on the firm-year profit-shifting responses. We use a number of different specifications and 
estimation methods and all yield similar results. Our main model predicts that a one standard 
deviation increase in independent non-executive directors (NEDs; also termed externals or 
outsiders) with audit experience and board size additively reduce profit-shifting behavior by 
around 6%. Further, a one standard deviation decrease in directors’ tenure, number of 
directorships, and network size collectively reduce profit-shifting response by approximately 
4.7%. Moreover, we find that CEO duality implies higher profit-shifting response by 
approximately 0.37%, which is economically a less notable effect compared to board structure and 
directors’ experience and network.   
In terms of economic significance, our results suggest a one standard deviation change in 
all the corporate governance variables of interest (those reflecting board size and independence, 
directors’ experience and CEO duality) yields an approximately 11% change in profit-sifting 
response. This implies an approximately 140,000 USD annual change for the mean parent, 640,000 
USD for the parent in the top 10% in network size, and 1,780,000 USD for the parent in the top 
1% in network size.  
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 Our study contributes to the profit-shifting literature by looking, for the first time, into the 
role of corporate governance. In many respects, we draw on the research of Dharmapala and Riedel 
(2013), especially in the way we estimate profit shifting. Our research also relates to a small but 
rapidly evolving literature on the determinants of profit shifting. From these studies, the more 
closely related to our research are the following. Markle (2016) shows that multinationals subject 
to territorial tax regimes shift more income than those subject to worldwide tax regimes, but the 
change is not statistically different when the worldwide firms can defer repatriation of the shifted 
income. Klassen and Laplante (2012) show that U.S. MNEs become more active at shifting income 
as the regulatory costs of shifting decrease.  
 Our research also contributes a specific example to a broader literature that explores 
governance mechanisms and their effect on tax planning. Brown (2011) and Brown and Drake 
(2014) show how boards can influence the adoption of more aggressive tax plans by tracing board 
interlocks and the aggressive tax planning of network corporations. Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer 
and Larcker (2015) focus on “knowledgeable” boards (in terms of financial expertise and 
independence) and their role in encouraging neither inadequate nor excessive tax planning 
aggressiveness. Li et al. (2017) show that country board reforms, particularly related to increasing 
member independence and eliminating CEO duality, increase cash ETR, on average. Bird and 
Karolyi (2017) focus primarily on institutional investors as a means of providing oversight to 
management with regard to tax planning. However, they show that a positive shock to institutional 
ownership, in conjunction with board turnover, magnifies the decrease in reported effective tax 
rate (ETR). Our study differs from these studies because we focus on a particular tax planning 
strategy, income shifting, rather than broad measures of tax avoidance, ETR or cash ETR. Further, 
our research design permits us to make stronger causal inferences. By focusing on a particular, but 
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widely used, tax plan, with a stronger research design, we are able to strengthen the inferences 
about the role of various parent board features on the risky tax planning activities of the firm.  
 Finally, our findings may benefit policy-makers as they attempt to (i) identify potential 
firms more likely to engage in profit shifting by looking, inter alia, at the corporate governance 
characteristics of MNEs and (ii) potentially containing excessive profit shifting by proposing 
changes in these characteristics. For example, Deloitte places corporate governance in the core of 
its analysis of corporate taxation (Deloitte, 2015). In turn, the OECD, within its base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS) initiative, directly links corporate governance with tax management (e.g., 
Centre for tax policy and Administration, 2009; Lambe, 2015). Governments have already begun 
related processes. For example, U.K. and Canada tax authorities undertake governance reviews in 
conjunction with their tax audits,2 and Australia has an extensive guide to the corporations’ 
responsibilities for tax oversight, including at the board of directors’ level.3  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical discussion and 
testable hypotheses for the effect of corporate governance characteristics on profit shifting. Section 
3 discusses the empirical analysis on the identification of profit shifting. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical findings on the effect of corporate governance characteristics on profit shifting. Section 
5 summarizes the main findings and offers policy implications. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations  
Profit shifting is part of the tax planning strategies of firms. In their review, Wilde and Wilson 
(2017) argue that tax planning encompasses deliberate efforts to reduce the corporate tax burden. 
																																								 																				
2 http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-_HMRCs_approach_to_assessing_tax_governance_and_Senior 
_Accounting_Officer_certification/$FILE/EY-tax-governance.pdf, and Misutka and MacEachern (2013). 
3 https://www.ato.gov.au/business/large-business/in-detail/key-products-and-resources/tax-risk-management-and-
governance-review-guide/ 
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Thus, we consider profit shifting as a specific but complicated method of tax planning. The word 
“complicated” is used because (i) profit shifting requires an international network of affiliates to 
be implemented; and (ii) profit shifting navigates a complex set of laws and regulations to permit 
firms to reduce their domestic tax base and allowing these earnings to be taxed in a foreign country.  
Both the profit-shifting activities of MNEs and their corporate governance have been of 
interest to researchers, as described more fully below. To the best of our knowledge, this study is 
the first that links these two areas of academic research. Profit shifting is typically a value-
enhancing activity for an MNE; however, like other forms of tax planning, it is not costless because 
it involves tax administration costs, opportunity and transaction costs, potential court penalties, 
and reputation costs (e.g., Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2016). These benefits and costs for the 
MNE imply that agency problems and certain corporate governance characteristics can lead 
managers to choose a level of profit shifting that differs from what shareholders would prefer 
(Armstrong et al., 2015; Slemrod, 2004).  
In the following, we examine the implications of existing literature on elements potentially 
linking corporate governance to profit shifting. We mainly draw these implications from the effects 
of corporate governance characteristics on firms’ performance and accounting transparency. The 
corporate governance characteristics that have been shown to play such a role are the board’s 
structure and directors’ experience and network.    
 
2.1. Board structure 
Where there is an agency conflict between shareholders and managers, greater board independence 
leads to better monitoring of managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). The motivation of NEDs to monitor managers results from their need to maintain 
their own reputation in the external directors’ labor market (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 
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1988; Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996). Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Desai, Dyck and 
Zingales (2007); and Desai and Dharmapala (2009) collectively develop a theory that relations 
between insiders, outsiders and the government have spill-over effects on the others. In particular, 
stronger governance will improve the compliance between insiders and the government through 
less aggressive tax reporting. While some subsequent empirical evidence contravenes this theory 
(Seidman and Stomberg, 2017; Blaylock, 2016; and Rego and Wilson, 2012), other papers provide 
evidence consistent with the theory (Li et al., 2017; Lennox, Lisowsky, and Pittman, 2013; Hasan, 
Hoi, Wu and Zhang, 2014; and Kim, Li, and Zhang, 2011). 
Empirical evidence finds that a higher number of NEDs is linked with (i) less financial 
fraud (Beasley, 1996; Uzun et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2006), (ii) fewer transfer-pricing 
manipulations (Lo et al., 2010), and (iii) lower propensity for opportunistic earnings management 
(Peasnell et al., 2005). Moreover, Dechow et al. (1996), McMullen (1996), and Beasley et al. 
(2000) find that expertise of outside directors in accounting or finance reduces fraud behavior and 
earnings management. On the same line, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) add that the absence of 
accounting or financial expertise renders the outside directors ineffective in curbing accounting 
errors and fraud.  
Profit shifting can result from reasonable, but opportunistic, application of the judgment 
necessary to determine intra-firm pricing or capital structuring. However, very aggressive use of 
this ambiguity can lead to costly, public and protracted challenges by tax authorities and other 
organizations (see, for example, Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2016). Thus, consistent with the 
arguments linking NEDs, especially those with audit experience, with lower levels of financial 
fraud, we expect that a larger number of board members with audit experience should reduce profit 
shifting. Enhanced board independence and audit expertise by board members promotes effective 
monitoring of the MNE’s tax planning activities (including the associated risks) and constrain 
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profit shifting within “reasonable” limits. By constraining management, NEDs maintain their own 
reputation and reduce conflict of interest between management and shareholders.  
Within the same theoretical context, CEO duality (the CEO also chairs the board) may also 
affect profit shifting aggressiveness. From an agency-theory perspective, the two roles should be 
separated because management and CEO monitoring lowers conflicts of interest (e.g., Jensen, 
1993). For example, CEO duality has been offered as an important reason for the failure of 
corporations like Enron and WorldCom. Adams et al. (2005) find that duality negatively affects 
firm’s performance by increasing the volatility of stock returns. Deli and Gillan (2000) and Klein 
(2002) find that duality has a small but negative effect on performance. Chen et al. (2006) find that 
duality increases the likelihood of fraud in firm operations. More closely related to our study, Lo 
et al. (2010) examine the role of duality in transfer pricing and find that transfer-pricing 
manipulations are more likely with duality in China. We thus expect that more intense conflicts of 
interest and loose monitoring due to duality might lead to higher levels of profit shifting. 
Similar to board independence, a number of studies find that communication and decision-
making of larger boards are less effective in representing shareholders’ interests compared to small 
boards (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Phrased differently, 
the coordination problems in a larger board overwhelm the advantages gained from having more 
people to draw on. Beasley (1996) finds that as the board size decreases, the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud decreases. 
In contrast, Bhagat and Black (1999) suggest that smaller boards with a large number of 
independent directors are not necessarily better in terms of shareholders’ interests. This board 
profile might lead to significant loss of firm-specific knowledge. Coles et al. (2008) find that there 
is no unique optimal board structure and suggest that complex firms (such as large firms, 
diversified firms, and high-debt firms) have larger boards because of the greater advising needs. 
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They also find weak evidence that insiders’ representation is positively correlated with R&D 
intensive firms, where the firm-specific knowledge is highly valued.  
Based on these theoretical considerations, we assert that firms with smaller boards and 
boards with fewer NEDs will engage in more profit shifting. Complex and risky profit shifting will 
be easier to communicate and justify to a smaller number of board members, and where fewer 
board members are independently knowledgeable. 
Based on the above theoretical considerations, we formulate our first hypothesis as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1. More independent and larger boards engage in less tax-motivated profit shifting. 
 
2.2. Directors’ experience 
Directors’ experience has also been a focal point of academic research. The main branches of this 
research consider the role of tenure and network as determinants of firms’ decision-making 
processes and performance. Concerning the first branch, the main argument is that it takes a 
lengthy period for directors to gain adequate understanding of a firm and the way it operates 
(Bacon and Brown, 1973; Huang, 2013). Celikyurt et al. (2014) add that firm-specific knowledge 
is accumulated as tenure increases over time and this knowledge leads to higher firm value. Burt 
(1992), Coleman (1988), and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) argue that a longer tenure relates to 
learning-by-doing processes and increased human capital (the know-how) and social capital (the 
acquaintances and networks). On the same line, Oh et al. (2006) and Pennings et al. (1998) examine 
the human and social capital, respectively, that members bring to their groups and how these 
positively affect their actions and effectiveness.  
Given that tax-motivated profit shifting is risky, complex, and potentially costly, long-
tenured directors with deeper firm-specific knowledge might be better acquainted with the MNEs 
operations in both the parent and the subsidiaries. They might even be assigned to direct and 
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monitor one or more affiliate companies and gain expertise in their internal operations as well as 
the business and legal environments within which these firms operate. This expertise reduces 
profit-shifting uncertainty, allows handling more complicated types of profit shifting, and 
generates important relevant networks and social capital. Thus, we hypothesize that long-tenured 
directors are more skilled in handling profit shifting. 
In turn, directors with a high number of directorships (multiple appointments) can generate 
benefits and increase firm value because of their large network and better access to resources, 
suppliers, and customers (e.g., Booth and Deli, 1995). A greater number of directorships for each 
board member also expands the network reach of the board. Brown and Drake (2014) show 
evidence consistent with the role of directors’ networks in reducing the firm’s effective tax rate 
when other firms in the network also have low ETRs.  
We formulate our second hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2. MNEs that have directors with longer tenure, more directorships, and larger 
network size engage in more tax-motivated profit shifting. 
 
We also note that a threshold potentially exists, above which directors are overcommitted 
(very busy) and thus potentially ineffective in monitoring managers (e.g., Fich and Shivdasani, 
2006). This “busyness” can reduce the monitoring of management, allowing the diversion of 
shareholders’ and managers’ preferences concerning profit shifting. This could lead to a decline 
in the disciplining role of the board when it comes to aggressive income shifting. 
 
3. First stage: Estimation of profit shifting  
3.1. Empirical model 
The ultimate goal of our research (and the second stage of our analysis) is to examine the effect of 
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MNEs’ corporate governance characteristics on profit shifting. To do this, we must first identify 
profit-shifting flows from each parent to each subsidiary. Broadly speaking, multinational firms 
might shift income to their affiliates for reasons unrelated to tax purposes (e.g., tunneling, risk-
sharing or internal capital operations). However, such profit shifting would apply to both low-tax 
and high-tax subsidiaries.  
We estimate tax-motivated profit shifting using the differences-in-differences (DID) model 
of Dharmapala and Riedel (2013). The basic idea of this model is to observe the effect of an 
exogenous shock to the parent’s pretax and pre-shifting profit, !"# on the subsidiaries in the low-
tax countries. These subsidiaries form a treatment group and subsidiaries in high-tax countries are 
a control group. In the presence of tax-motivated income shifting, we expect that an exogenous 
increase in the parent pretax and pre-shifting profits (i.e., a positive earnings shock) would exert a 
positive impact on the pretax profits of a low-tax subsidiary relative to a high-tax subsidiary. 
The empirical model takes the form: 
 $%&!'# = )' + +,$%&-'# + +.$%&!"# + +/ 0'# ∙ $%&!"# + +20'# + 
     +3$4546'# + 7# + 4'#.       (1) 
The dummy variable 0'# in the above equation is the DID identifier: it equals one if the subsidiary 
faces a lower corporate tax rate than the parent firm; it equals zero otherwise.4 In line with 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), we also control for the subsidiary	9′s size, -'#, and its exposure to 
debt, $4546'#. Further,	7# is a set of fixed effects of different dimensions (i.e., subsidiary fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects, and country-year fixed effects)5 and e is the 
remainder disturbance. 
																																								 																				
4 This dummy is not eliminated by the inclusion of country fixed effects because it depends not only on the corporate 
tax rates of the subsidiary country but also on the tax rate of the parent country. 
5 Regressions with multiple fixed effects often entail singleton groups, i.e., groups with only one observation.  
According to Correia (2015), “Keeping singleton groups in such regressions is not only computationally inefficient, 
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 To construct !"#, we follow Bertrand et al. (2002) and use the system of equations: 
 !"# = ;"# ∗ ="#,         (2) 
 ;"# = >?@>?@? ∙ ;A#A , ; ≠ C,  ∀	E ∈ {1, … , K}.      (3) 
In equations (2) and (3),	="# denotes the total assets of the subsidiary 9′M parent firm ;, =A# the total 
assets of comparable parent firms C in year E, and ;A# = !A# =A# the comparable parents’ pretax 
profit over total assets. The product of the average industry profitability ratio, ;"#, with the parent 
total assets, ="#, in eq. (2) scales this instrument of parent earnings at the firm-year level. 
Therefore, the estimation of equation (1) yields a firm-year estimates of profit shifting. Even 
though we have information on the variable for the actual parent earnings, using !"# is necessary 
to ensure the shocks are exogenous.6 Importantly, using shocks from comparable firms (and not 
from the parent) improves inference in the second stage of our analysis by mitigating potential 
reverse-causality issues between the profit-shifting shocks and corporate governance 
characteristics of parent firms. We discuss this further below.  
We define a firm as comparable if it belongs in the same industry (4 digit NACE) and 
country each year with the specific parent firm p. To construct the set of comparable firms, we use 
all the national and multinational firms included in Orbis for which information on profits and total 
assets is available (this amounts to more than a million observations).7 We keep only the 
subsidiary-year combinations in our sample if (i) each set of comparable firms includes at least 10 
firms and (ii) the subsidiaries operate in different four-digit NACE industries than their parent 
																																								 																				
but overstates the statistical significance of the regression coefficients and might lead to incorrect inference.” Thus, 
we drop all singleton groups from our regressions. 
6 The correlation between the true parent earnings and !"# is 0.85. The descriptive statistics of the two variables are 
also similar, with	!"# exhibiting (as expected) somewhat larger variation.  
7 To avoid the correlation (and the endogeneity) that arises if we include a firm itself in the calculation of its industry 
profitability and then use that industry’s profitability to predict the firm’s own profit, we exclude the firm itself from 
the set of comparable firms. 
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companies. The first requirement increases the accuracy of our measure by providing a sufficient 
level of information for each industry. The second requirement prevents industry shocks from 
driving the reported pretax profits of each subsidiary. 
 If tax-motivated profit shifting occurs, then we expect +/ to be positive.8 This implies that 
for each given level of corporate-tax difference between the parent and the subsidiary firms, a 
parent-firm earnings shock,	!"#, will propagate asymmetrically toward low-tax subsidiaries 
compared to high-tax subsidiaries.  
 
3.2. Data and variables 
For the first stage of our empirical analysis we mainly obtain data from Orbis, which provides 
accounting data for national and multinational firms worldwide.9 After dropping missing 
observations for our main variables, we have a sample of around 18,000 observations from 6,698 
subsidiaries and 860 parent firms for the period 2009-2013. This sample includes subsidiaries from 
49 countries and parent firms from 24 countries. In Table A1 we provide summary statistics for 
the parent firms and their subsidiaries by country and in Table A2 a correlations matrix for the 
main variables of our study. 
For subsidiaries, we use unconsolidated statements; for parents, we rely on consolidated 
statements. Consolidated parent profits can shift to low-tax subsidiaries and should be included in 
the analysis (as opposed to only including unconsolidated profits) given that we examine profits 
shifted only from parents to subsidiaries and not among subsidiaries. If we do not include the 
																																								 																				
8 Under an extreme scenario, β3 could be negative. If for a certain period a large number of low-tax subsidiaries are 
systematically located in high tax uncertainty countries (i.e., in countries with frequent changes in their corporate tax 
rates) and the corporate tax rate changes upwards, then the MNE will see an increase in the “cost” of profit-shifting.  
9 Information from Orbis has the drawback that the ownership structure is only available for the last reported year 
(2013 in our sample). In line with previous studies, this is not a key concern because the potential misclassification of 
parent-subsidiary connections would, if anything, bias our results toward zero (e.g., Budd et al., 2005).  
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profits of the consolidated parent firms, we might lose an important part of profit shifting. The 
only part of these profits to exclude are those of subsidiary i. However, as discussed, for the 
construction of the average industry profitability index (;"#) we use data for comparable firms, 
implying that the profits of subsidiary i are not included. Thus, it might even be preferable to use 
consolidated data, which nets out potential profit shifting (as the considered firm is a 
multinational), when determining the earnings shock variable. In turn, for ="# in equation (2), we 
avoid double counting the assets of subsidiary i in the parent’s consolidated statement by 
subtracting the subsidiary’s total assets from the parent’s total assets. 
Table 1 formally defines all variables of the empirical analysis and provide the data 
sources. We measure subsidiary i’s profits using the log of pretax earnings (EBT), subsidiary’s 
size using the log of subsidiary’s total assets,10 and financial leverage using the ratio of total debt 
to total assets. We use the variables in logs due to their high skewness and this limits our sample 
to subsidiaries with positive earnings before interest and taxes (e.g., Hines and Rice, 1994). 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis. The 
number of observations in Table 2 differs slightly from the one reported in the regression tables 
because we drop singleton-group observations. Our sample includes relatively large parent firms 
that operate a number of foreign subsidiaries worldwide. This allows exploiting differences even 
among subsidiaries of the same parent firm that reside in different countries. The average parent 
firm in our sample has pretax profits of $2.78 billion USD; the average subsidiary has pretax profits 
of $31.5 million USD and total assets of $312.8 million USD. Further, 55% of the subsidiaries in 
our sample face lower corporate tax rates than their parents do. 
																																								 																				
10 Alternatively, we could use other control variables for firm size, such as the log of fixed assets or the number of 
employees. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively very similar.   
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We use statutory tax rates to define whether a subsidiary is low tax. Our choice is 
theoretically justified because multinationals shift profits among subsidiaries already abroad and 
thus take advantage of tax allowances in countries in which they already operate. Having done so, 
the advantage of transferring a dollar of profit from a high-tax country to a low-tax country depends 
on differences in statutory rates (See the appendix and Deveraux and Mafini, 2007, for further 
discussion). 
 
3.3. Estimates of profit-shifting response 
Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (1). In columns 1 to 3, we employ different 
sets of fixed effects. In all specifications, the coefficient on Low-tax subsidiary * Parent profit is 
positive and statistically significant. According to the most restrictive specification in column 3, a 
10% increase in the parent’s earnings implies that low-tax subsidiaries receive 0.59% more profit 
than the high-tax subsidiaries. Given our sample’s mean value of EBT, the coefficient on Low-tax 
subsidiary * Parent profit in column 3 implies that a 10% increase in parent earnings leads to an 
increase in profit shifting by $0.19 million US (i.e., 0.59*$31.5 million US) per subsidiary. In our 
sample (after dropping singleton groups) the mean parent firm owns 12.2 subsidiaries and 55% of 
them are low-tax subsidiaries. These statistics imply that approximately $1.25 million US of profit 
per parent firm is shifted toward low-tax jurisdictions (see calculations in Table A3 of the 
appendix). 
[Insert Table 3 about here]  
Finally, we use +/ to calculate the partial fitted values N"OP#'OQ = +/ 0'# ∙ $%&!"# , which 
represent the response of subsidiary’s earnings to a 1% increase in parent profits. This is our 
estimate of Profit-shifting response (;M6'#) by subsidiary-year, which is the dependent variable in 
16	
the second stage of our analysis. Notably, as in Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), profit shifting is 
only derived from +/ and not from the total effect of !"#. In other words, the coefficient +. does 
not reflect shifted income to a subsidiary; it reflects a co-movement between parent shocks and 
subsidiary profits. This co-movement can be due to, for example, productivity linkages between 
parent and subsidiary profits. 
 
4. Second stage: The effect of corporate governance on profit shifting 
4.1. Empirical model, data, and variables 
To examine whether corporate governance characteristics affect the firm-year Profit-shifting 
response, ;M6'#, we estimate the model: ;M6'# = RS + R,&'# + R.T'# + 7U + V'#,       (4) 
where g is the vector of governance characteristics,  f is the vector of subsidiary-year and/or parent-
year control variables, and u is the stochastic disturbance.11 As in equation (1), we also include 
several types of fixed effects 7U. 
 Information for the corporate governance variables is from BoardEx. These variables are 
for each director level and, thus, we calculate averages by parent and year. We group the corporate 
governance variables into two categories, namely board structure and directors’ experience. These 
groups reflect our hypotheses in section 2. Concerning board structure, we use the number of 
independent NEDs with functional experience in audit committees (NEDs audit experts), the total 
number of directors (Board size), and a dummy variable (Duality) that takes the value 1 if the CEO 
																																								 																				
11 An alternative empirical approach would be to conduct the analysis in a single stage, where we introduce triple 
interactions between governance characteristics and the DID identifier in equation (1). These interaction terms would 
show the differential level of profit shifting due to the governance characteristics. However, this approach would 
imply introducing several triple interaction terms (because of the use of several corporate governance variables), 
implying a statistical stretch of our data with possible multicollinearities. We do, however, conduct a robustness test 
on our baseline findings using the model with triple interactions and find results consistent with our main tests. 
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is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Concerning directors’ experience, we use the 
mean directors’ tenure in the board (Tenure), the number of multiple directorships held by the 
directors (Number of directorships), and the directors’ network size (Network size).  
 We report summary statistics in Table 2. The mean NEDs audit experts is 0.57 and the 
mean Board size is approximately 13 directors. Also, 50.5% of the parent firms in our sample have 
CEO/Chairman duality. Each director serves on average for 7.1 years in the same board and the 
mean board has almost 28 directorships. The mean Network size approximately equals 9,000 firms.  
We control for a number of additional factors in equation (4), also defined in Table 1. There 
are additional board characteristics that are potentially important, but the current agency theory 
does not strongly suggest hypotheses in this context. First, we control for the share of female 
directors in the board. Females are believed to hold stricter attitudes towards law compliance and 
more conservative financial reporting (Francis et al., 2015), and might exert higher audit effort 
(Gul et al., 2008). Next, we control for the directors’ mean age because several studies suggesting 
that conservatism increases with an executive’s age (e.g., MacGrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; 
Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Wu et al., 2005). Further, we control for the audit committee’s 
size. A larger audit committee might reduce profit shifting because it will be more effective in 
fulfilling its monitoring role. Last, the presence of directors from the subsidiary’s country might 
increase MNEs’ profit shifting to that subsidiary due to their experience with the fiscal and 
accounting environment where the subsidiary resides (e.g., Masulis et al., 2012).  
At the subsidiary-year and parent-year levels, we control for firm size, leverage, and firm 
growth rates. As in the first stage of our analysis, we also use subsidiary, parent, year, industry-
year, and country-year fixed effects. The parent and subsidiary fixed effects are particularly 
important because they imply identification from within-firm changes in corporate governance 
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characteristics and not from the full cross-section. Overall, the fixed effects make equation (4) 
immune from relevant alternative explanations of the findings. 
A potentially important endogeneity problem is reverse causality between psr and g: parent 
firms strategically choose their future corporate governance characteristics because of the current 
level of profit shifting to their subsidiaries. Similar arguments can be found in most recent studies 
examining the effect of corporate governance on firm performance. However, as briefly discussed 
in section 3.1, we do not expect reverse causality to be important in the estimating equation (4) 
because we estimate profit-shifting shocks (and not the level of profit shifting) and these shocks 
are derived from profits of comparable firms (and not the profits of the own parent firms). To the 
extent that there is no causal effect running from the board characteristics of comparable firms to 
the profit-shifting activity of the parent firms, there should be no reverse causality. 
 
4.2. Main empirical results 
Table 4 reports our baseline results from the estimation of equation (4). Besides the usual 
coefficient estimates and t-statistics, we standardize our results across the different governance 
variables by reporting the change in Profit-shifting response from a one standard deviation increase 
in each corporate governance variable.12 This allows the direct comparison of the effects of the 
corporate governance characteristics of main interest. Specifications (2) to (4) sequentially add 
more control variables 
We include subsidiary fixed effects, parent fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry-year 
fixed effects, and country-year fixed effects. Using these fixed effects increases the adjusted R-
squared to about 95%, implying that the omitted-variable bias, if present, is small.   
																																								 																				
12 We standardize coefficients using the product (R, ∗ M0), where c1 is obtained from the estimation of equation (4) 
and sd is the standard deviation of each relevant variable in Table 2. 
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 Our model shows that firms with more NEDs audit experts, larger Board size, and without 
Duality exhibit lower profit shifting. These coefficients on the first two variables are significant at 
the 1% level, are in line with hypotheses 1, and highlight the importance of the board structure for 
profit shifting. The coefficient estimates on Duality are less statistically significant (at the 5% or 
10% level). In turn, in line with hypothesis 2, our model predicts that increases in Tenure, Number 
of directorships, and Network size, significantly increase MNEs’ profit shifting.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The results are also economically significant. According to the specification with all the 
controls (column 4), decrease in Profit-shifting response, which is the largest effect among our six 
main corporate governance variables. The second and third largest effects come from Network size 
(approximately 2.5%) and Number of directorships (approximately 1.25%), respectively. The 
smallest effect economically is that of Duality.  
Perhaps more importantly, the lower part of Table 4 shows the total effect on Profit-shifting 
response of corporate governance characteristics related to board structure is around 6.4% and the 
equivalent of directors’ experience is around 4.7%. To provide an even more integrated picture of 
our results, we highlight that a one standard deviation increase in NEDs audit experts and Board 
size, along with an equivalent decrease in the rest of the corporate governance characteristics of 
main interest, implies approximately an 11.06% reduction in Profit-shifting response. Applying 
this response magnitude to the sample firms yields an annual USD reduction in profit shifting that 
ranges from $140 thousand for the parent in our sample with 12.2 subsidiaries (mean of our 
sample), to $0.64 million for a parent with 56.2 subsidiaries (90th centile), and to around $1.78 
million for a parent with 157.5 subsidiaries (99th centile). We provide the analytical calculations 
for these values in Table A3. 
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4.3. Robustness 
We conduct several sensitivity tests on the baseline results.13 Following Armstrong et al. (2015), 
we show in Table A4 that our data exhibit a low within variation for the corporate governance 
variables, whereas the within variation of Profit-shifting response is comparatively larger (more 
than 100 times larger than the relative variation of the corporate governance variables). As a 
consequence profit shifting should only be one of the many targets (and perhaps one of lesser 
importance) that are considered when a firm decides on its board’s characteristics.  
We conduct two more tests to show that there is indeed very limited (if not statistically 
negligible) probability of the effect running from psr to g. First, we use the approach of Fich and 
Shivdashani (2006) and estimate models with the board characteristics as dependent variables and 
Profit-shifting response as the main explanatory variable (among the rest of the controls). We 
estimate the models with Poisson maximum likelihood (PML) for all the corporate governance 
variables that are count variables, with the logistic regression for the Duality dummy and with 
OLS for Tenure, as the latter is a continuous variable. If we find that the effect of Profit-shifting 
response in these regressions is statistically insignificant, then we limit the possibility of reverse 
causality.  
Table 5 reports the results. All models include at least the usual control variables of 
previous specifications. However, we use additional industry and country controls because we 
cannot use the full array of fixed effects (maximum likelihood models do not converge). We define 
these variables in Table 1. Clearly, the results suggest that the effect of Profit-shifting response on 
the key corporate governance variables is statistically insignificant for all the corporate governance 
characteristics. This shows no evidence for a causal effect running from our measure of profit 
																																								 																				
13 For expositional brevity, from this point onward we do not include the effect of all of the control variables in the 
tables. These results are available on request. 
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shifting to boardroom characteristics.14 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Second, following the previous corporate governance literature (e.g., Wintoki et al., 2012; 
Minnick and Noga, 2010), we experiment with a GMM model that is also suitable to account for 
the potential dynamics (persistence) in Profit-shifting response. Specifically, we use the Blundell 
and Bond (1998) two-step GMM to control for simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (e.g., 
Wintoki et al., 2012; Minnick and Noga, 2010). GMM for dynamic panels, albeit sensitive to the 
instruments used, provide a series of specification tests to verify the strength of the instruments 
(e.g., Hansen and Sargan tests) and exclude serial correlation (AR test). Formally, the estimated 
equation is: ;M6'# = RS + ;M6'#Y, + R,&'# + R.T'# + V'#,      (5) 
where for the lagged ;M6'#Y,, we utilize as instruments the (E − 2) and (E − 3) values of ;M6'#.  We 
prefer the two-step GMM, whose standard covariance matrix is robust to panel-specific 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and performs somewhat better in terms of lower bias 
(Windmeijer, 2005). We use robust standard errors (Windmeijer’s correction).  
Table 6 reports the results in a manner like Table 4. The AR(2) and Hansen tests confirm 
that our model does not suffer from autocorrelated errors and overidentifying restrictions. 
Concerning the effect of board structure, both NEDs audit experts and Board size continue to exert 
a negative impact on Profit-shifting response at a 1% level of statistical significance. The 
difference is that the effect of Board size is economically smaller. Moreover, the positive 
coefficient on Duality is considerably higher than the equivalent in Table 4 and significant at 1%. 
																																								 																				
14 Table A5 provides further sensitivity tests by controlling for the average industry corporate governance 
characteristics instead of the own parent governance characteristics. The results are very similar with those in Table 
4. 
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Similarly, the variables reflecting directors’ experience (Tenure, Number of directorships, and 
Network size) have a positive and statistically significant effect on Profit-shifting response. 
Overall, the total economic significance of the corporate governance variables is a bit smaller 
compared to our baseline results, albeit the statistical significance is even stronger.    
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Further, in the first two columns of Table 7, we use Profit-shifting response estimates 
obtained from specifications (1) and (2) of Table 3. In column 3, we cluster the standard errors at 
the country-year level instead of the subsidiary level to avoid relevant heteroscedasticity driving 
our inference. Last, in column 4, we aim to mitigate the potential bias arising from carrying the 
error in Profit-shifting response from the first stage, and we use bootstrapping with 200 
replications (see e.g., Efron and Tibshirani, 1993, Chapter 10). The results from these 
specifications are very similar to the ones of Table 4. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 8 provides further sensitivity tests using alternative variables to define board 
independence. We replace NEDs audit experts with NEDs with CFO experience (column 1), Ind. 
NEDs on audit comm. (column 2), and NED with audit experience (column 3). The results from 
these regressions are similar to the baseline, both in terms of statistical and economic significance. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
As suggested in footnote 11, an alternative modelling framework would be to use triple 
interaction terms between the variables capturing profit shifting 0'#	×	$%&!'#  and each corporate 
governance variable. The advantage of this all-in-one single-stage approach is that we do not have 
to “carry” an error term in the second stage.15 However, we favor the two-stage approach used in 
																																								 																				
15 Of course, the results from the bootstrapping approach are not overly sensitive to this issue. 
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the bulk of our analysis for two reasons. First, numerous triple interactions might cloud inference 
because of the considerable non-linearity introduced in the model (it might even require non-
parametric econometrics) and associated multicollinearity. Second, triple interactions imply 
different slopes only for the variables included in the interactions and not for the rest of the control 
variables. Thus, all other slopes (on the rest of the governance variables, other control variables, 
and fixed effects) and the intercept will be assumed to have no direct impact on the level of profit 
shifting. To avoid this we would need interaction terms between the DID term and all controls and 
fixed effects, further complicating the model.  
In spite of these issues, we do check the sensitivity of our findings when using triple 
interaction terms. We use two indicators for board characteristics. The first, termed Good 
structure, is a binary variable equal 1 when there is a large enough number of NEDs audit experts 
and Board size (values are above the 1st quartile), and when Duality equals 0. The second, termed 
Experienced directors, equals 1 if Tenure, Number of directorships, and Network size take values 
above the 1st quartile. For full definitions, please see Table 1.  
We report the estimates in Table A6. In line with our baseline results, the estimates on the 
triple interaction 0'#	×	$%&!'#	×^%%0	ME6VREV64  in columns 1 and 2 show that Good structure 
has a negative effect on profit shifting. Similarly, the triple interaction 0'#	×	$%&!'#	×_`;4694aR40	0964RE%6  in columns 3 and 4 is positive and significant at the 5% level. These 
estimates suggest once again that “more” connected and experienced directors are associated with 
higher levels of profit shifting. 
Finally, in Table 9 we examine the effect of corporate governance on profit shifting only 
for the U.S. parent firms. The results are qualitatively similar to those of Table 4, albeit with two 
interesting differences. First, the results are a bit smaller in terms of economic significance. This 
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finding is in line with Markle (2016), who notes that MNEs subject to worldwide tax regimes (such 
as the U.S.) shift less income. Perhaps more interestingly for our study, the effect of Duality turns 
negative, albeit with a small economic significance. This result can be explained by the increasing 
pressure (mostly by shareholders but also governance experts) to separate the roles of the CEO 
and the board’s chairman, which in turn leads to stricter monitoring by those CEOs with dual roles 
in an effort to avoid the change. This argument is in line with Larcker and Tayan (2016), who 
document these pressures and several cases in which firms decided in favor of duality.       
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Profit shifting is currently viewed as the single most important practice of MNEs and concern has 
been growing that aggressive profit shifting undermines the fairness and integrity of tax systems 
worldwide. This is mainly because MNEs can use profit shifting to exploit competitive advantages 
and the untaxed income bears an opportunity cost for the public sector. OECD’s inclusive 
framework on BEPS brings together over 100 countries and jurisdictions to collaborate on the 
implementation of the OECD/ G20 BEPS Package. This pushes forward ongoing efforts to update 
international tax rules for the 21st century and limit profit-shifting activities. 
In this study, we consider for the first time the role of corporate governance of MNEs as a 
set of practices affecting profit shifting. We use data for MNE subsidiaries in 49 countries, parent 
firms in 24 countries, and approximately 18,000 subsidiary-year observations for 2009-2013. Our 
empirical strategy aims to first identify exogenous profit-shifting responses due to earnings shocks 
to parent firms. Subsequently, we examine the role of corporate governance characteristics as 
explanatory variables of the estimated profit-shifting responses. 
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Our baseline model finds that an increase of one standard deviation in independent NEDs 
with audit experience and board size additively reduces profit shifting by around 6%. Furthermore, 
a one standard deviation decrease in tenure, number of directorships, and network size reduces the 
MNEs’ profit-shifting response by approximately 4.7%. Finally, we find that duality implies 
higher profit-shifting response by approximately 0.37%, even though this result is almost the 
opposite when we use a U.S. sample.  Collectively, these changes yield an approximately 11% 
reduction in profit shifting by parent firm-year. This estimation is robust to an extensive series of 
sensitivity tests, including tests to mitigate endogeneity concerns. 
These results are important from a policy perspective; they imply that tax authorities would 
benefit from taking a closer look at MNEs’ corporate governance. Encouraging stronger corporate 
governance would help to prevent profit shifting. Further, MNEs with a low number of NEDs and 
board members, and extensive directors’ tenure, network size and number of directorships are 
more likely to engage in aggressive profit shifting. 
 On the prevention front, our findings point to the need for policy initiatives ranging from 
guidelines to regulation. As the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project moves forward 
to fulfill its objectives for increased transparency and tax fairness, we provide evidence that 
corporate governance practices could hold a role in the design and implementation of this initiative. 
However, there seems to be consensus that more NEDs and a smaller board size positively 
contribute to firm performance; thus, the direction of the effects we identify are the same as the 
board structure–firm performance nexus. In the case of the directors’ experience, however, which 
is hard to encourage or regulate, there is a tradeoff between profit shifting and firm performance.  
 Our research opens new pathways for academic research. The potential interplay between 
profit shifting and (i) gender diversity in the boardroom, (ii) the strategic use of directors from 
subsidiary countries, and (iii) executive compensation has either briefly been analyzed in this 
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paper, but more can be accomplished in future research. Further research could address the 
challenges of identifying the relation between these potential mechanisms and profit shifting, an 
effort that may require resorting to natural experiments. Another avenue for future research is 
identifying the precise profit-shifting mechanisms, such as transfer pricing and intra-group 
financial transactions, through which corporate governance affects profit shifting. Finally, future 
research could examine the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations in specific industries 
for reasons unrelated to profit shifting (e.g., banking) as a means through which profit shifting 
might be reduced. We leave these ideas for future research. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Name Description Data source 
EBT Subsidiary’s pre-tax profits (in logs). Orbis 
Low-tax subsidiary Dummy variable equal to one if the corporate tax rate in the 
subsidiary’s country is lower than the one in the parent’s country 
and zero otherwise. 
OECD, KPMG 
Parent profit !9E = ;CE=9E, where !9E denotes the parent’s pre-tax & pre-shifting 
profit. It is constructed as the product of the asset weighted 
average profitability of all firms in the same 4-digit NACE 
industry in the same country and the parent’s total asset stock (i.e., ;C = =C=CC ;CC , 9 ≠ C	 and ;C = !C=C ). 
Orbis, OECD, 
KPMG 
Subsidiary total assets Subsidiary’s total assets (in logs). Orbis 
Subsidiary leverage Subsidiary’s leverage, defined as total debt/ total assets.  Orbis 
Sub. country GDP per capita Subsidiary country's GDP per capita (in logs). World Bank 
Sub. country population Subsidiary country's permanent residents (in logs). World Bank 
Profit-shifting  The estimated value of profit-shifting response calculated running 
the DID approach of Dharmapala and Riedel (2013).  
Orbis 
Profit-shifting 2  The estimated value of profit-shifting response calculated running 
the DID approach of Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), while 
controlling only for subsidiary and time fixed effects. 
Orbis 
Profit-shifting 3 The estimated value of profit-shifting response calculated running 
the DID approach of Dharmapala and Riedel (2013), while 
controlling only for subsidiary fixed effects, time fixed effects, 
and industry-year fixed effects. 
Orbis 
NEDs audit experts  The number of independent non-executive directors with 
functional experience in audit committees. 
BoardEx  
Board size The number of total directors in the board. BoardEx 
Duality Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board. 
BoardEx  
Tenure  The average tenure for directors in the board. BoardEx 
Number of directorships The total number of directorships per board (private boards). BoardEx 
Network size The summation of the network size of all directors in the board. BoardEx  
Female directors The number of female directors in the board. BoardEx 
Audit committee size The number of directors in the audit committee. BoardEx 
Mean age of the board The average age of directors in the board. BoardEx  
Directors from subsidiary country The number of directors in the board that come from a country 
where the group owns at least one subsidiary. 
BoardEx  
Parent total assets Parent’s total assets (in logs). Orbis 
Parent leverage Parent’s leverage defined as total debt/ total assets. Orbis 
Growth of parent total assets Annual growth rate of parent’s total assets. Orbis 
NEDs with CFO experience The number of independent NEDs with experience as CFO. BoardEx 
NED with audit experience  Dummy variable equal to one if the board has independent NEDs 
with experience in audit committees. 
BoardEx 
Subsidiaries' industry ROA The average industry ROA for each subsidiary. Orbis 
Parents' industry ROA The average industry ROA for each parent. Orbis 
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Parent country GDP per capita Parent country's gross domestic product per capita (in logs). World Bank 
Parent country population Parent country's permanent residents (in logs). World Bank 
Sub. country government debt Subsidiary’s country total government debt as a % of GDP. World Bank 
Ind. NEDs on audit committee The total number of independent NEDs in the audit committee.  BoardEx 
Ind. NEDs audit experts  The average NEDs audit experts by parent country, year, and 
industry. 
BoardEx 
Ind. board size The average Board size by parent country, year, and industry. BoardEx 
Ind. duality The average Duality by parent country, year, and industry. BoardEx 
Ind. tenure  The average Tenure by parent country, year, and industry. BoardEx 
Ind. number of directorships The average Number of directorships by parent country, year, and 
industry. 
BoardEx 
Ind. network size The average Network size by parent country, year, and industry. BoardEx 
Ind. female directors The average Female directors by parent country, year, and 
industry. 
BoardEx 
Ind. audit committee size The average Audit committee size by parent country, year, and 
industry. 
BoardEx 
Ind. mean age of the board The average Mean age of the board by parent country, year, and 
industry. 
BoardEx 
Ind. directors from subsidiary country The average Number of directors from the subsidiary’s country 
by parent country, year, and industry. 
BoardEx 
Good structure Dummy variable equal to one if NEDs audit experts, and Board 
size take values above the 1st quartile, and Duality equals zero 
(and zero otherwise). 
BoardEx 
Experienced directors Dummy variable equal to one if Tenure, Number of directorships, 
and Network size take values above the 1st quartile (and zero 
otherwise). 
BoardEx 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
The table reports the number of observations as well as the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the 
main variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are defined in Table 1. The monetary units are in thousand USD 
(current prices of 2005), while population is in thousand individuals. 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
       EBT 17,873 31,512 4,022 236,260 0.583 17,000,000 
Low-tax subsidiary 17,873 0.550 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Parent profit 17,873 2,776,984 971,259 4,974,853 284.1 51,100,000 
Subsidiary total assets 17,873 312,811 38,021 1,873,277 10.27 73,600,000 
Subsidiary leverage 17,873 0.597 0.613 0.384 -0.011 33.93 
Subsidiary GDP per capita 17,873 33.03 37.15 12.90 0.948 81.85 
Subsidiary population 17,873 78,244 62,276 191,149 414.5 1,357,380 
Profit-shifting 17,873 0.358 0.692 0.329 0.000 0.829 
Profit-shifting 2 17,873 0.379 0.721 0.348 0.000 0.877 
Profit-shifting 3 17,873 0.359 0.691 0.329 0.000 0.830 
NEDs audit experts  17,873 0.570 0.000 0.727 0.000 4.000 
Board size 17,873 13.24 11.00 5.837 4.000 30.00 
Duality 17,873 0.505 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Tenure  17,873 7.064 6.400 3.080 0.800 25.70 
Number of directorships 17,873 27.97 16.00 27.27 0.000 159.0 
Network size 17,873 9.062 7.216 7.493 0.063 38.68 
Female directors 17,873 1.924 2.000 1.441 0.000 9.000 
Audit committee size 17,873 4.009 4.000 1.498 0.000 8.000 
Mean age of the board 17,873 59.05 58.71 3.893 39.80 68.67 
Directors from subsidiary country 17,873 2.259 2.000 1.517 0.000 8.000 
Parent total assets 17,873 32,900,000 12,700,000 48,500,000 3,628 350,000,000 
Parent leverage 17,873 0.622 0.636 0.168 0.035 1.661 
Growth of parent total assets 17,873 0.063 0.045 0.128 -0.986 0.993 
NED with CFO experience 17,873 0.855 1.000 0.957 0.000 5.000 
NED with audit experience  17,873 0.442 0.000 0.497 0.000 1.000 
Subsidiaries' industry ROA 17,873 13.34 13.35 2.229 0.315 38.38 
Parents' industry ROA 17,873 8.030 8.550 2.646 0.460 22.57 
Parent country GDP per capita 17,868 39.60 39.47 6.280 3.122 65.62 
Parent country population 17,868 133,132 66,028 117,877 4,560 1,350,695 
Government debt  13,948 73.10 68.99 32.28 6.564 196.0 
Ind. NEDs on audit comm. 17,873 2.666 3.000 1.769 0.000 8.000 
Ind. NEDs audit experts  17,873 0.562 0.530 0.536 0.000 2.853 
Ind. board size 17,873 13.01 11.00 5.263 4.000 27.22 
Ind. duality 17,873 0.504 0.607 0.418 0.000 1.000 
Ind. tenure  17,873 7.074 6.678 2.263 1.400 25.70 
Ind. number of directorships 17,873 27.34 15.54 24.32 0.000 120.0 
Ind. network size 17,873 8.662 8.182 5.792 0.111 34.17 
Ind. female directors 17,873 1.858 1.583 1.167 0.000 6.729 
Ind. audit committee size 17,873 3.979 3.908 1.248 0.000 8.000 
Ind. mean age of the board 17,873 59.03 58.77 3.287 39.80 68.86 
Ind. directors from subsidiary country 17,873 2.194 1.887 1.203 0.000 6.379 
Good structure 17,873 0.191 0.000 0.393 0.000 1.000 
Experienced directors 17,873 0.481 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
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Table 3: Identification of profit-shifting response 
The Table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) from the DID model of equation 
(1), with robust standard errors clustered by subsidiary. The observational units are MNE subsidiaries 
with a foreign parent firm. The dependent variable is EBT and all variables are defined in Table 1. 
The lower part of the Table indicates the type of fixed effects used in each regression. Year effects 
(industry-year effects) indicate a full set of year fixed effects (industry-year fixed effects at the 2-digit 
NACE level). Country-year effects represent a full set of country-year fixed effects for the 
subsidiary’s country. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Low-tax subsidiary * Parent profits 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 [2.927] [2.740] [2.685] 
Low-tax subsidiary -0.848*** -0.801*** -0.822*** 
 [-2.995] [-2.776] [-2.784] 
Parent profits 0.034 0.014 0.014 
 [1.406] [0.532] [0.486] 
Subsidiary total assets 0.689*** 0.698*** 0.699*** 
 [16.279] [15.566] [15.565] 
Subsidiary leverage -0.574*** -0.777*** -0.774*** 
 [-4.963] [-8.390] [-8.079] 
Population 2.088** 1.750**  
 [2.519] [1.994]  
GDP per capita 1.338*** 1.292***  
 [5.288] [4.976]  
Observations 16,139 15,925 15,903 
Number of subsidiaries 4,864 4,790 4,790 
Adjusted R-squared 0.885 0.887 0.887 
S.E. Clustering by Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary 
Subsidiary effects √ √ √ 
Parent effects √ √ √ 
Year effects √ - - 
Industry-year effects - √ √ 
Country-year effects - - √ 
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Table 4: The effect of corporate governance on profit-shifting 
The Table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) for all explanatory variables, as well as the percentage 
effect on profit-shifting responses by parent firm from a one standard deviation change for the main corporate governance 
variables. To obtain this percentage effect for each variable, we calculate the product (R ∗ ME-a0-60_0459-E9%a). The 
observational units are multinational subsidiaries with a foreign parent firm. All variables are defined in Table 1. The 
dependent variable is shown in the first line. For expositional brevity, the corporate governance variables are divided by 100. 
The lower part of the Table indicates the type of fixed effects used in each regression. Year effects (industry-year effects) 
indicate a full set of year fixed effects (industry-year fixed effects at the 2-digit NACE level). Country-year effects represent 
a full set of country-year fixed effects for the subsidiary’s country. We also report the total percentage profit-shifting reduction 
from a one standard deviation change in board characteristics. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent: Profit-shifting (1) (2) (3) (4) 
B
oa
rd
 S
tr
uc
tu
re
 
NEDs audit experts -1.504*** -1.596*** -1.601*** -1.593*** 
 [-3.662] [-3.789] [-3.770] [-3.746] 
 1.09% 1.16% 1.16% 1.16% 
Board size -0.715*** -0.712*** -0.823*** -0.830*** 
 [-3.873] [-3.638] [-4.141] [-4.184] 
 4.17% 4.16% 4.80% 4.84% 
Duality 0.483* 0.521* 0.726** 0.728** 
 [1.668] [1.726] [2.401] [2.409] 
 0.24% 0.26% 0.37% 0.37% 
D
ir
ec
to
rs
' E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
Tenure 0.144 0.331** 0.305** 0.309** 
 [1.426] [2.240] [2.068] [2.093] 
 0.44% 1.02% 0.94% 0.95% 
Number of directorships 0.066** 0.064** 0.046* 0.046* 
 [2.515] [2.439] [1.801] [1.792] 
 1.80% 1.75% 1.25% 1.25% 
Network size 0.294*** 0.324*** 0.326*** 0.331*** 
 [2.928] [3.202] [3.235] [3.288] 
 2.20% 2.43% 2.44% 2.48% 
C
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
co
nt
ro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 Female directors  -0.176 0.009 0.028 
  [-0.782] [0.042] [0.123] 
Audit committee size  0.094 0.013 0.001 
  [0.453] [0.064] [0.007] 
Mean age of the board  -0.262*** -0.280** -0.273*** 
  [-2.115] [-2.277] [-2.27] 
Directors from subsidiary country  -0.007 0.043 0.041 
  [-0.019] [0.116] [0.110] 
Su
bs
id
ia
ry
 a
nd
 p
ar
en
t f
ir
m
s'
 
co
nt
ro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Parent total assets   0.058*** 0.055*** 
   [6.539] [5.797] 
Parent leverage   0.053** 0.048* 
   [2.102] [1.888] 
Growth of parent total assets    0.011*** 
    [1.447] 
Subsidiary total assets    0.003 
    [0.990] 
Subsidiary leverage    -0.027*** 
    [-2.669] 
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 Dependent: Profit-shifting (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Observations 15,903 15,903 15,903 15,903 
 Number of subsidiaries 4,790 4,790 4,790 4,790 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 
 S.E. Clustering by Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary 
 Subsidiary effects √ √ √ √ 
 Parent effects √ √ √ √ 
 Year effects - - - - 
 Industry-year effects √ √ √ √ 
 Country-year effects √ √ √ √ 
% effect of an 1 s.d. change in board structure 5.51% 5.58% 6.34% 6.37% 
% effect of an 1 s.d. change in directors' experience 4.45% 5.19% 4.64% 4.69% 
% effect of an 1 s.d. change in board's characteristics 9.96% 10.77% 10.98% 11.06% 
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Table 5: Robustness for reverse causality 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) of regressions based on Poisson Maximum likelihood 
(columns 1-4), logistic estimation (column 5), and OLS estimation (column 6) with robust standard errors. The observational 
units are multinational subsidiaries with a foreign parent firm. All variables are defined in Table 1. The dependent variables 
are shown at the 2nd line of the table. The lower part of the table indicates the type of fixed effects used in each regression. 
Year indicates a full set of year fixed effects. The ***, **, and * mark denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Estimation: Poison Maximum Likelihood Logit OLS 
Dependent variable: NEDs audit 
experts 
Board size Number of 
directorships 
Network 
size 
Duality Tenure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Profit-shifting  -0.021 0.001 -0.036 0.001 24.325 0.001 
 [-0.446] [0.189] [-1.269] [0.096] [1.585] [1.252] 
NEDs audit experts  -0.888*** -9.232*** 3.963*** -382.758*** 0.186*** 
  [-4.061] [-6.624] [7.960] [-7.012] [5.320] 
Board size -2.345***  6.379*** 7.384*** 60.968*** -0.101*** 
 [-2.764]  [25.801] [36.827] [3.326] [-5.315] 
Duality -26.345*** -2.645*** -14.247*** 14.975***  -0.129*** 
 [-3.929] [-6.730] [-18.794] [19.990]  [-2.983] 
Tenure  6.524*** -0.871*** 0.561* -2.726*** 68.155***  
 [4.860] [-6.197] [1.696] [-12.691] [3.201]  
Number of directorships -1.414*** 0.295***  -0.112*** -22.993*** 0.001 
 [-6.816] [19.040]  [-4.113] [-6.223] [0.625] 
Network size 2.727*** 2.025*** 0.963***  -26.745** -0.059*** 
 [4.629] [34.341] [3.069]  [-2.355] [-7.324] 
Total number of females -11.314*** 2.611*** -3.955*** -0.395 85.282*** -0.017 
 [-6.540] [26.193] [-14.775] [-1.533] [2.770] [-0.954] 
Audit committee size 32.792*** 3.403*** 2.725*** 0.031 316.098*** 0.069*** 
 [22.716] [20.755] [4.964] [0.104] [6.257] [3.298] 
Mean age of the board -6.324*** -0.240** -0.422 2.569*** -59.713*** 0.519*** 
 [-5.774] [-2.016] [-1.475] [12.606] [-3.879] [31.976] 
Directors from subsidiary 
country 
-10.007*** 0.803*** -4.665*** 2.235*** -184.939*** -0.035* 
[-5.505] [6.226] [-13.076] [9.424] [-3.471] [-1.659] 
Parent total assets 0.219*** 0.061*** -0.035 0.063*** -11.012*** -0.002** 
 [3.600] [8.180] [-1.336] [3.970] [-5.709] [-2.064] 
Parent leverage 0.621*** -0.062*** 0.456*** -0.015 2.979 0.014*** 
 [4.839] [-3.047] [6.964] [-0.399] [0.824] [5.864] 
Growth of parent total assets -0.182*** -0.009 0.042*** -0.074*** 6.917*** 0.003*** 
 [-3.855] [-1.337] [2.658] [-8.588] [6.397] [3.307] 
Subsidiary total assets -0.016 0.002 0.013* -0.009** 0.283 0.000 
 [-0.772] [0.936] [1.929] [-2.058] [0.800] [0.055] 
Subsidiary leverage 0.042 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.400 0.002 
 [0.565] [0.303] [-0.101] [-0.290] [0.315] [1.348] 
Subsidiaries' industry ROA 0.013*** -0.001* -0.002 -0.000 0.078 0.000** 
 [2.602] [-1.804] [-1.031] [-0.128] [0.799] [2.453] 
Parents' industry ROA 0.005 0.003*** -0.014*** 0.007*** -0.780*** 0.000** 
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 [1.139] [4.200] [-7.005] [5.872] [-4.615] [2.481] 
Estimation: Poison Maximum Likelihood Logit OLS 
Dependent variable: NEDs audit 
experts 
Board size Number of 
directorships 
Network 
size 
Duality Tenure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub. country GDP per capita 0.024 -0.006 -0.068 0.079 -7.407 -0.009 
 [0.065] [-0.186] [-0.602] [0.932] [-1.308] [-1.519] 
Sub. country population -1.494 -0.145 -0.772** -0.062 -2.311 0.023 
 [-1.475] [-1.552] [-2.535] [-0.303] [-0.129] [1.599] 
Parent country GDP per 
capita 
-3.159*** -0.067 0.132 -0.739*** 264.701*** -0.006 
[-4.159] [-1.229] [1.040] [-6.426] [8.600] [-0.802] 
Parent country population -9.862*** -1.094*** 2.657*** 0.961*** 487.609*** -0.130*** 
 [-3.696] [-9.301] [8.586] [4.023] [5.586] [-7.671] 
Sub. country government 
debt 
-0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001*** 0.026 -0.000*** 
[-0.790] [1.257] [-0.497] [3.073] [1.450] [-2.635] 
Observations 5,956 12,410 12,404 12,410 1,877 12,410 
Number of subsidiaries 1,961 4,094 4,091 4,094 534  
Subsidiary effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Year effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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Table 6: GMM estimates 
The Table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) from the estimation of equation (5) using 
the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM. The dependent variable is Profit-shifting. We use robust standard 
errors, corrected with Windmeijer’s (2005) procedure. We use the t−2 and t−3 lags of Profit-shifting as our 
external instruments. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at the 
5% level. The regressions include the controls of column (5) of Table 5. For expositional brevity, the corporate 
governance covariates are divided by 100. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NEDs audit experts -1.195*** -1.063*** -1.132*** -1.148*** 
 [-3.793] [-3.189] [-3.273] [-3.320] 
Board size -0.240*** -0.182*** -0.171*** -0.159*** 
 [-6.420] [-3.668] [-3.107] [-2.854] 
Duality 1.781*** 1.526*** 1.525*** 1.522*** 
  [8.897] [8.250] [8.259] [8.258] 
Tenure in the same Board 0.192*** 0.159*** 0.132*** 0.124*** 
 [5.230] [3.528] [2.938] [2.712] 
Number of directorships 0.014* 0.019** 0.018** 0.020*** 
 [1.909] [2.456] [2.418] [2.587] 
Company network size 0.228*** 0.242*** 0.214*** 0.219*** 
 [8.840] [8.863] [6.945] [7.073] 
Female directors  -0.343*** -0.322*** -0.305*** 
  [-3.382] [-3.153] [-2.983] 
Audit committee size  -0.148 -0.117 -0.133 
  [-1.466] [-1.123] [-1.273] 
Mean age of the board  0.101*** 0.105*** 0.110*** 
  [2.954] [2.999] [3.134] 
Directors from subsidiary country  -0.069 -0.101 -0.099 
   [-0.617] [-0.905] [-0.885] 
Parent total assets   0.001 0.001 
   [1.412] [1.325] 
Parent leverage   -0.024*** -0.023*** 
    [-3.714] [-3.394] 
Growth of parent total assets    0.014*** 
    [2.838] 
Subsidiary total assets    -0.001 
    [-1.136] 
Subsidiary leverage    -0.012*** 
    [-2.854] 
Profit-shifting (1 lag) 0.948*** 0.947*** 0.945*** 0.943*** 
 [181.512] [180.914] [177.653] [173.921] 
Constant 0.006 -0.047** -0.054*** -0.044** 
 [1.077] [-2.537] [-2.685] [-2.100] 
Observations 13,782 13,782 13,782 13,771 
Number of no 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,025 
AR1 test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test p-value 0.463 0.468 0.476 0.469 
Hansen test of over-identification p-value 0.117 0.123 0.130 0.120 
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Table 7: Sensitivity for alternative profit-shifting estimates and standard error correction 
The Table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) of regressions based on equation (4) with robust 
standard errors. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries with a foreign parent firm. All variables are defined 
in Table 1. The dependent variable in each specification is denoted in the second line of the Table. For expositional 
brevity, the corporate governance variables are divided by 100. Year effects (industry-year effects) indicate a full set of 
year fixed effects (industry-year fixed effects at the 2-digit NACE level). Country-year effects represent a full set of 
country-year fixed effects for the subsidiary’s country. The regressions include the controls of column (4) of Table 5. 
The ***, **, and * mark denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Estimation method: OLS Bootstrap   
(200 rep.) 
Dependent variable: Profit-shifting 
response 2 
Profit-shifting 
response 3 
Profit-shifting 
response 
Profit-shifting 
response 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Independent NED  -1.660*** -1.590*** -1.593*** -1.531*** 
 [-3.746] [-3.746] [-2.846] [-3.198] 
Board size -0.865*** -0.828*** -0.830** -0.820*** 
 [-4.184] [-4.184] [-2.296] [-4.048] 
Duality 0.759** 0.727** 0.728* 0.655* 
 [2.409] [2.409] [1.885] [1.881] 
Tenure in the same Board 0.322** 0.308** 0.309 0.282 
 [2.093] [2.093] [1.514] [1.572] 
Number of directorships 0.048* 0.046* 0.046 0.050* 
 [1.792] [1.792] [0.920] [1.749] 
Company network size 0.345*** 0.330*** 0.331** 0.357*** 
 [3.288] [3.288] [2.125] [3.551] 
Observations 15,903 15,903 15,903 15,904 
Number of subsidiaries 4,790 4,790 4,790 4,790 
Adjusted R-squared 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.946 
S.E. Clustering by Subsidiary Subsidiary Country Subsidiary 
Corporate governance controls √ √ √ √ 
Firms’ controls √ √ √ √ 
Subsidiary effects √ √ √ √ 
Parent effects √ √ √ √ 
Year effects - - - - 
Industry-year effects √ √ √ √ 
Country-year effects √ √ √ √ 
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Table 8: Sensitivity to alternative definitions of board independence 
The Table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) of regressions based on equation (4) with 
robust standard errors. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries with a foreign parent firm. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. The dependent variable is Profit-shifting response. To obtain this percentage 
effect for each variable, we calculate the product (R ∗ ME-a0-60_0459-E9%a). For expositional brevity, the 
corporate governance variables are divided by 100. Year effects (industry-year effects) indicate a full set of year 
fixed effects (industry-year fixed effects at the 2-digit NACE level). Country-year effects represent a full set of 
country-year fixed effects for the subsidiary’s country. The regressions include the controls of column (4) of Table 
5. The ***, **, and * mark denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
   Dep.: Profit shifting (1) (2) (3) 
B
oa
rd
 S
tr
uc
tu
re
 
NEDs with CFO experience -1.495***   
 [-4.023]   
 1.09%   
Ind. NEDs on audit comm.  -0.906***  
  [-2.456]  
  1.60%  
NED with audit experience   -1.463*** 
   [-2.889] 
   0.78% 
Board size -0.756*** -0.825*** -0.805*** 
 [-3.775] [-4.166] [-4.066] 
 4.41% 4,82% 4.70% 
Duality 0.646** 0.984*** 0.983*** 
 [2.129] [3.286] [3.252] 
 0.32% 0.49% 0.49% 
D
ir
ec
to
rs
' E
xp
er
ie
nc
e Tenure  0.283** 0.260* 0.286** 
 [1.933] [1.761] [1,920] 
 0.87% 0.80% 0.88% 
Number of directorships 0.043 0.053* 0.049* 
 [1.660] [2.070] [1.935] 
 1.17% 1.45% 1.34% 
Network size 0.309*** 0.330*** 0.301*** 
 [3.041] [3.249] [2.968] 
 2.32% 2.47% 2.26% 
  Observations 16,175 16,175 16,175 
  Number of subsidiaries 4,835 4,835 4,835 
  Adjusted R-squared 0.946 0.946 0.946 
  Subsidiary effects √ √ √ 
  Parent effects √ √ √ 
  Industry-year effects √ √ √ 
  Country-year effects √ √ √ 
% effect of an 1 s.d. change in board synthesis 5.82% 6.91% 5.97% 
% effect of an 1 s.d. change in directors' experience 4.36% 4.72% 4.48% 
% effect of an 1 s.d. change in board's characteristics 10.18% 11.63% 10.45% 
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Table 9: Only U.S. parent firms 
The Table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) for all explanatory variables, as well as the percentage 
effect on profit-shifting responses by parent firm from a one standard deviation change for the main corporate governance 
variables. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries with a foreign parent firm. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. The dependent variable is shown in the first line. For expositional brevity, the corporate governance variables are 
divided by 100. The lower part of the Table indicates the type of fixed effects used in each regression. Year effects 
(industry-year effects) indicate a full set of year fixed effects (industry-year fixed effects at the 2-digit NACE level). 
Country-year effects represent a full set of country-year fixed effects for the subsidiary’s country. We also report the total 
percentage profit-shifting reduction from a one standard deviation change in board characteristics. The ***, **, and * 
marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent: Profit shifting Profit shifting 2 Profit shifting 3 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
NEDs audit experts -0.221*** -0.230*** -0.220*** 
 [-3.044] [-3.044] [-3.044] 
Board size -0.210*** -0.219*** -0.210*** 
 [-5.208] [-5.208] [-5.208] 
Duality -0.466*** -0.486*** -0.465*** 
 [-4.963] [-4.963] [-4.963] 
Tenure in the same Board 0.049** 0.051** 0.049** 
 [1.995] [1.995] [1.995] 
Number of directorships 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 [1.962] [1.962] [1.962] 
Company network size 0.138*** 0.144*** 0.138*** 
 [9.061] [9.061] [9.061] 
Total number of females 0.081* 0.085* 0.081* 
 [1.767] [1.767] [1.767] 
Audit committee size 0.078** 0.081** 0.078** 
 [2.025] [2.025] [2.025] 
Mean age of the board -0.099*** -0.103*** -0.099*** 
 [-3.584] [-3.584] [-3.584] 
Directors from subsidiary country 0.311*** 0.324*** 0.310*** 
 [5.320] [5.320] [5.320] 
Parent total assets 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 
 [28.366] [28.366] [28.366] 
Parent leverage -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 [-5.051] [-5.051] [-5.051] 
Growth rate of parent total assets 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 [2.217] [2.217] [2.217] 
Subsidiary total assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.692] [0.692] [0.692] 
Subsidiary leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [-0.273] [-0.273] [-0.273] 
Observations 4,492 4,492 4,492 
Adjusted R-squared 0.993 0.993 0.993 
Number of subsidiaries 1,318 1,318 1,318 
S.E. Clustering by Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary 
Subsidiary effects √ √ √ 
Parent effects √ √ √ 
Industry-year effects √ √ √ 
Country-year effects √ √ √ 
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Appendix 
 
This Appendix, intended for online use only, includes four sections. The first section discusses our 
choice to use the statutory tax rates. The second section includes Tables A1 and A2, which provide 
more information on our sample and the correlations between the main variables of our analysis. 
The third section includes Table A3, which provides an explicit example on the calculation of the 
dollar value of profit shifting from Profit-shifting response. The fourth section includes Tables A4 
and A5, which provide further evidence on why reverse causality is not a significant problem in 
the second stage of our empirical analysis. Finally, Table A6 reports results from the estimation of 
a single-stage model with triple interaction terms.   
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On the use of statutory tax rates 
To justify the use of the statutory tax rate in the identification of profit shifting, we follow 
Deveraux and Mafini (2007). Firms take relevant decisions in four stages. First, they decide 
whether to produce domestically and export goods abroad or to produce abroad. To make this 
choice, the company must assess the net post-tax income of each strategy, taking into account the 
different forms of taxation (i.e., local government tax, repatriation tax, tariffs). Thus, taxation in 
this case is better captured by the effective average tax rate. Conditional on choosing to produce 
abroad or not, the second decision concerns the location of production abroad, the criteria being 
similar to the ones in the first stage. Thus, the effective average tax rate is once again the most 
appropriate tax measure for this decision. In turn, conditional on a particular location, the firm 
must choose the investment’s value. In this regard, the firm has to make a marginal decision, i.e., 
to equate the marginal benefit to the marginal cost of the investment. To reach a decision the firm 
should measure the impact of taxation using the effect of the tax on the cost of capital. This is 
determined by an effective marginal tax rate. In the final stage, the multinational firm chooses the 
location of its profits. We can assume quite realistically that firms take advantage of any tax 
allowances in any country in which they operate. Having done so, the advantage of transferring a 
dollar of profit from a high-tax country to a low-tax country must depend on differences in the 
statutory (and not the effective) tax rate. 
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Table A1: Information on firms in our sample by parent firms’ countries 
The Table reports the number of parent firms by country, the number of subsidiaries these parent firms own, the number of 
parent firms in each country as a share of the total parent firms in our sample (e.g., Australia has 5/860=0.58% of our 
sample), the equivalent share for subsidiaries (e.g., Australia has 13/6,698 subsidiaries or the 0.19% of our sample), and 
how many subsidiaries each parent firm owns by country. 
Country Parents Parents 
% 
Subsidiaries Subsidiaries 
% 
Subsidiaries/ 
parent 
Low-tax 
subsidiaries 
Australia 5 0.58% 13 0.19% 2.60 50.00% 
Austria 3 0.35% 22 0.33% 7.33 29.03% 
Belgium 6 0.70% 82 1.22% 13.67 89.36% 
China 1 0.12% 4 0.06% 4.00 0.00% 
Denmark 5 0.58% 27 0.40% 5.40 34.48% 
Finland 9 1.05% 65 0.97% 7.22 48.76% 
France 52 6.05% 763 11.39% 14.67 56.81% 
Germany 49 5.70% 1001 14.94% 20.43 50.11% 
Greece 3 0.35% 10 0.15% 3.33 0.00% 
Ireland 1 0.12% 14 0.21% 14.00 10.00% 
Israel 2 0.23% 4 0.06% 2.00 0.00% 
Italy 13 1.51% 121 1.81% 9.31 18.97% 
Japan 6 0.70% 361 5.39% 60.17 44.49% 
Netherlands 10 1.16% 77 1.15% 7.70 31.84% 
Norway 9 1.05% 43 0.64% 4.78 20.31% 
Poland 4 0.47% 20 0.30% 5.00 0.00% 
Portugal 2 0.23% 8 0.12% 4.00 0.00% 
Russian Federation 6 0.70% 59 0.88% 9.83 0.73% 
Spain 30 3.49% 300 4.48% 10.00 30.63% 
Sweden 31 3.60% 420 6.27% 13.55 27.51% 
Switzerland 1 0.12% 5 0.07% 5.00 0.00% 
Turkey 2 0.23% 3 0.04% 1.50 0.00% 
United Kingdom 258 30.00% 1332 19.89% 5.16 17.07% 
United States of America 352 40.93% 1944 29.02% 5.52 99.63% 
Total 860 100.00% 6,698 100.00% 7.79 27.49% 
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Table A2: Correlations matrix  
Panel A: Firm characteristics (Sample size N=18,134) 
 
EBT Parent profit 
Profit-
shifting 
response 
Low-tax 
subsidiary 
Subsidiary 
total assets 
Parent total 
assets 
Subsidiary 
leverage 
Parent 
leverage 
Growth of parent total 
assets 
EBT 1.000          
Parent profit 0.158* 1.000         
Profit-shifting response -0.001 0.317* 1.000        
Low-tax subsidiary -0.030* 0.203* 0.985* 1.000       
Subsidiary total assets 0.807* 0.174* 0.006 -0.023* 1.000      
Parent total assets 0.142* 0.961* 0.260* 0.153* 0.175* 1.000     
Subsidiary leverage -0.092* 0.027* -0.115* -0.126* -0.069* 0.052* 1.000    
Parent leverage -0.024* 0.157* -0.253* -0.272* -0.004 0.263* 0.163* 1.000   
Growth of parent total assets -0.008 0.002 0.017 0.019 -0.010 -0.007 -0.014 -0.049 1.000  
 
Panel B: Corporate governance characteristics (Sample size N=18,134) 
 
NEDs audit 
experts 
Board 
size Tenure 
No. of di-
rectorships 
Network 
size Duality 
Mean age 
of the board 
Directors 
from subs. 
country 
Female 
directors 
Audit com-
mittee size 
NEDs audit experts  1.000         
Board size -0.274* 1.000        
Tenure  0.036* -0.182* 1.000       
Number of directorships -0.284* 0.701* -0.147* 1.000      
Network size 0.112* 0.425* 0.067* 0.193* 1.000      
Duality -0.248* 0.259* 0.318* 0.148* 0.214* 1.000     
Mean age of the board -0.083* -0.039* 0.392* -0.141* 0.242* 0.298* 1.000    
Directors from subsidiary country 0.002 0.552* -0.222* 0.349* 0.382* -0.030* -0.062* 1.000   
Female directors -0.068* 0.548* -0.001 0.424* 0.455* 0.147* -0.016 0.387* 1.000  
Audit committee size 0.069* 0.446* -0.102* 0.196* 0.346* 0.035* -0.024* 0.346* 0.248* 1.000 
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Table A3: Examples of the profit shifting calculation of MNE 
 Calculations for the: Mean parent 
firm 
Parent firm at 
the top 10% of 
subsidiaries 
Parent firm at 
the top 1% of 
subsidiaries 
1. DID estimation for profit shifting for 
1% increase of parent earnings: 
0.059% 0.059% 0.059% 
2. DID estimation for profit shifting for 
10% increase of parent earnings: 
0.590% 0.590% 0.590% 
3. Sample mean subsidiary EBT: 31,512,000 31,512,000 31,512,000 
4. Average profit-shifting per 
subsidiary ( (2)*(3) ): 
185,921 185,921 185,921 
5. Average number of subsidiaries 
owned by each global ultimate 
owner (parent): 
12.2 56.2 157.5 
6. The mean fraction of low-tax 
subsidiaries: 
55% 55% 55% 
7. Profit-shifting per parent                   
( (4)*(5)*(6) ): 1,247,530 5,746,818 16,074,730 
8. Predicted governance effect on 
profit-shifting: -11.06% -11.06% -11.06% 
9. USD predicted reduction of profit-
shifting per parent firm( (7)*(8) ): 140,000 640,000 1,780,000 
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Table A4: Decomposition of the corporate governance variation 
The Table reports the overall, the between, and the within variation for the main corporate governance variables. 
N, n, and T-bar is the number of total observations, the number of subsidiaries, and the mean observations per 
firm in our sample. 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations 
Profit-shifting overall 1,506 469.3 1,000 2,284 N =   18,134 
 between  458.8 1,000 2,279 n =    6,631 
 within  94.09 599.2 2,394 T-bar = 2.735 
       
NEDs audit experts overall 0.570 0.727 0.000 4.000 N =   18,134 
 between  0.698 0.000 4.000 n =    6,631 
 within  0.241 -0.930 1.970 T-bar = 2.735 
       
Board size overall 13.20 5.810 4.000 30.00 N =   18,134 
 between  5.607 4.000 30.00 n =    6,631 
 within  0.645 7.003 17.00 T-bar = 2.735 
       
Duality overall 0.507 0.500 0.000 1.000 N =   18,134 
 between  0.478 0.000 1.000 n =    6,631 
 within  0.165 -0.293 1.307 T-bar = 2.735 
 
Tenure overall 7.113 3.129 0.800 25.70 N =   18,134 
 between  3.093 1.080 21.03 n =    6,631 
 within  0.756 2.922 15.92 T-bar = 2.735 
       
Number of directorships overall 3.232 2.816 1.000 70.50 N =   18,094 
 between  3.082 1.000 70.50 n =    6,617 
 within  0.566 -11.99 16.09 T-bar = 2.734 
       
Network size overall 9.059 7.489 0.063 38.68 N =   18,134 
 between  7.222 0.063 36.46 n =    6,631 
 within  0.963 1.685 15.41 T-bar = 2.735 
       
Female directors overall 1.918 1.440 0.000 9.000 N =   18,134 
 between  1.348 0.000 9.000 n =    6,631 
 within  0.566 -0.749 4.918 T-bar = 2.735 
       
Audit committee size overall 4.010 1.494 0.000 8.000 N =   18,134 
 between  1.444 0.000 8.000 n =    6,631 
 within  0.391 1.610 6.010 T-bar = 2.735 
       
Mean age of the board overall 59.14 3.993 39.80 80.00 N =   18,134 
 between  4.166 40.74 80.00 n =    6,631 
 within  0.960 49.39 68.89 T-bar = 2.735 
       
Directors from subsidiary 
country 
overall 2.251 1.513 0.000 8.000 N =   18,134 
between  1.476 0.000 8.000 n =    6,631 
 within  0.373 -0.415 4.751 T-bar = 2.735 
49	
Table A5: Identifying reverse causality (adding more controls) 
The Table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) of regressions based on Poisson Maximum likelihood (columns 
1-4), logistic (column 5), and OLS (column 6) with robust standard errors. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries with 
a foreign parent firm. All variables are defined in Table 1. The dependent variables are specified in the 2nd line of the Table. The lower 
part of the Table indicates the type of fixed effects used in each regression. Year indicates a full set of year fixed effects. The ***, **, 
and * mark denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Estimation: Poison Maximum Likelihood Logit OLS 
Dependent variable: NEDs audit 
experts 
Board size Number of 
directorships 
Network 
size 
Duality Tenure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Profit-shifting  -0.027 -0.003 -0.048 0.011 6.428 0.001 
 [-0.575] [-0.289] [-1.546] [0.662] [0.463] [0.533] 
NEDs audit experts  1.466*** -0.303 6.295*** -11.660 0.259*** 
  [3.634] [-0.367] [7.624] [-0.186] [4.260] 
Board size -1.525  4.670*** 6.264*** 108.436*** -0.147*** 
 [-0.994]  [18.376] [16.063] [2.788] [-5.511] 
Duality 33.030*** -5.051*** -18.367*** 16.497***  -0.418*** 
 [3.775] [-8.116] [-19.130] [13.891]  [-5.531] 
Tenure  8.679*** -0.457** 0.575* -0.486 97.514***  
 [6.339] [-2.361] [1.842] [-1.604] [4.290]  
Number of directorships -0.241 0.156***  -0.278*** -32.414*** -0.012*** 
 [-1.636] [8.601]  [-6.760] [-6.371] [-4.395] 
Network size 7.013*** 1.039*** -0.699***  22.944 -0.037*** 
 [6.919] [9.444] [-2.922]  [1.415] [-2.808] 
Total number of females -11.800*** 2.555*** -5.436*** -3.594*** 39.886 -0.001 
 [-4.874] [20.132] [-18.567] [-10.178] [0.818] [-0.031] 
Audit committee size 31.232*** 1.367*** -3.641*** -1.414** -49.077 -0.082** 
 [17.647] [4.817] [-6.150] [-2.392] [-0.744] [-2.282] 
Mean age of the board -4.020*** -0.553*** -0.158 0.687*** -42.253*** 0.365*** 
 [-3.807] [-3.821] [-0.612] [2.734] [-2.675] [14.678] 
Directors from subsidiary 
country 
-10.208*** -0.488*** -4.823*** 3.171*** -116.228 -0.002 
[-5.139] [-2.813] [-10.757] [8.702] [-1.635] [-0.058] 
Parent total assets 0.174*** 0.058*** 0.002 0.065*** -6.839*** 0.002* 
 [2.848] [7.718] [0.098] [3.685] [-4.015] [1.868] 
Parent leverage 0.302*** -0.064*** 0.549*** 0.006 -3.308 0.015*** 
 [2.906] [-2.751] [8.222] [0.148] [-1.111] [5.814] 
Growth of parent total assets -0.012*** -0.003*** 0.010*** -0.004*** 4.563*** 0.000 
 [-8.277] [-3.574] [5.265] [-2.922] [5.263] [0.211] 
Subsidiary total assets -0.020 0.003 0.009 -0.004 0.087 0.000 
 [-0.955] [1.389] [1.305] [-0.683] [0.284] [0.298] 
Subsidiary leverage -0.018 -0.005 0.007 -0.009 0.720 0.002 
 [-0.253] [-0.738] [0.392] [-0.570] [0.637] [1.336] 
Subsidiaries' industry ROA 0.011** 0.001 -0.004** 0.002 0.191** 0.000 
 [2.332] [0.719] [-2.408] [1.402] [2.238] [0.928] 
Parents' industry ROA 0.010** 0.007*** -0.004* 0.008*** -0.848*** 0.000 
 [2.195] [9.053] [-1.936] [5.841] [-6.319] [1.613] 
Sub. country GDP per capita 0.580 -0.072* -0.016 0.023 -4.638 -0.013* 
 [1.508] [-1.829] [-0.133] [0.232] [-0.867] [-1.897] 
Estimation: Poison Maximum Likelihood Logit OLS 
Dependent variable: NEDs audit 
experts 
Board size Number of 
directorships 
Network 
size 
Duality Tenure 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sub. country population -1.005 0.016 -0.334 0.047 5.483 0.012 
 [-0.907] [0.135] [-1.057] [0.186] [0.328] [0.691] 
Parent country GDP per capita -3.456*** 0.041 -0.030 -0.780*** 223.073*** 0.006 
 [-4.320] [0.643] [-0.210] [-5.335] [8.737] [0.684] 
Parent country population -12.498*** -0.638*** 2.243*** 1.173*** 415.394*** -0.124*** 
 [-4.318] [-4.461] [6.947] [3.894] [6.562] [-6.158] 
Sub. country government debt -0.001 0.000* -0.000 0.001* 0.025 -0.000*** 
 [-1.017] [1.724] [-0.388] [1.868] [1.475] [-4.654] 
Observations 6,065 12,619 12,613 12,619 1,908 12,619 
Number of subsidiaries 1,986 4,135 4,132 4,135 542 4,135 
Subsidiary effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Year effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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Table A6: Sensitivity for profit-shifting using triple interactions 
The Table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) with robust standard errors. The 
observational units are multinational subsidiaries with a foreign parent firm. All variables are defined in Table 
1. The dependent variable is EBT. In columns (2) and (4) we cluster our standard errors at the country-year 
level. For expositional brevity, the corporate governance variables are divided by 100. Industry-year effects 
indicate a full set of industry-year fixed effects at the 2-digit NACE level. Country-year effects represent a 
full set of country-year fixed effects for the subsidiary’s country. The ***, **, and * mark denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Good Board Structure 
Experienced Board 
Directors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Low-tax subsidiary * Parent profits * Good 
structure 
-0.071* -0.071*   
[-1.857] [-1.751]   
Low-tax subsidiary * Parent profits * 
Experienced Directors 
  0.081** 0.081** 
  [2.176] [2.080] 
Low-tax subsidiary * Parent profits 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.044* 0.044* 
 [3.092] [3.731] [1.702] [1.925] 
Low-tax subsidiary -1.043*** -1.043*** -0.621* -0.621** 
 [-3.162] [-3.798] [-1.820] [-2.044] 
Parent profits -0.006 -0.006 0.025 0.025 
 [-0.215] [-0.223] [0.791] [0.764] 
Good structure -0.807* -0.807*   
 [-1.725] [-1.675]   
Low-tax subsidiary * Good structure 0.909* 0.909*   
 [1.801] [1.693]   
Parent profits * Good structure 0.066* 0.066*   
 [1.812] [1.770]   
Experienced Directors   1.123** 1.123** 
   [2.460] [2.286] 
Low-tax subsidiary * Experienced Directors   -1.182** -1.182** 
   [-2.253] [-2.123] 
Parent profits * Experienced Directors   -0.078** -0.078** 
   [-2.385] [-2.210] 
Tenure -0.593 -0.593   
 [-0.709] [-0.724]   
Number of directorships 0.080 0.080   
 [0.605] [0.568]   
Network size 0.090 0.090   
 [0.172] [0.172]   
NEDs audit experts   -3.112 -3.112 
   [-1.394] [-1.372] 
Board size   -0.001 -0.001 
   [-0.002] [-0.001] 
Observations 15,744 15,744 15,744 15,744 
Adjusted R-squared 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 
Number of Subsidiaries 4,739 4,739 4,739 4,739 
S.E. Clustering by Subsidiary Country Subsidiary Country 
Corporate governance controls √ √ √ √ 
Subsidiary controls √ √ √ √ 
Parent controls √ √ √ √ 
Subsidiary effects √ √ √ √ 
Industry-year effects √ √ √ √ 
Country-year effects √ √ √ √ 
 
